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Abstract 
Restructuring the electricity market may secure efficiencies by moving away from cost-of-service 
regulation, with typically (but not necessarily) time-invariant prices, and allowing prices to reflect how 
costs change. Charging “real time” prices requires that electricity use be measured according to when one 
uses it. Arguments that such real-time metering should be a policy objective promoted by subsidizing 
meters or delaying restructuring until meters are installed, require more than these potential benefits. They 
require positive externalities to imply that too few meters would be installed through private transactions. 
Real-time metering presents no systematic externalities when utilities must serve peak period users, and 
may present negative externalities under some conditions. Positive externalities are likely when electricity 
is rationed through blackouts. Real-time metering may or may not increase welfare when peak period 
wholesale markets are not competitive; one might want to prohibit real-time metering in such situations 
even if metering itself were costless. 
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Market Failures in Real-Time Metering: A Theoretical Look 
Timothy J. Brennan* 
I. Why have real-time metering? 
The marginal cost of producing electricity varies considerably over time. During off-peak 
times, the cost of supplying an additional kilowatt-hour of electricity can be as little as a penny 
or two. During on-peak times, prices can easily be many multiples of baseload levels, with 
reported price spikes of 100 or 200 times off-peak rates. One of the benefits associated with 
restructuring of electricity markets has been the potential efficiencies that would be secured by 
moving away from the current cost-of-service system, in which we typically (but not 
necessarily)1 have time-invariant prices, to prices that reflect how costs change. With prices that 
vary by time in such a way to follow electricity prices, a homeowner might choose to dry clothes 
or run the dishwasher at night rather than during the day, or an office manager might turn up the 
thermostat during hot afternoons when electricity for air conditioning is in great demand.   
A crucial feature in charging ideal prices is having use be assigned on virtually a minute-
by-minute basis. Electricity demand is not accurately predictable. A relatively sudden change in 
weather can lead to a significant shift in demand, for example, when warmer than expected 
temperatures increase use of air conditioners. In those moments, electricity costs and prices can 
dramatically skyrocket.2 A first contributing factor is that high electricity demand will invoke the 
                                                 
* Professor, Policy Sciences and Economics, University of Maryland Baltimore County, and Senior Fellow, 
Resources for the Future. Email: brennan@umbc.edu. Discussions with Dallas Burtraw, Joseph Doucet, Paul 
Joskow, Andrew Kleit, and Karen Palmer were very helpful. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
Rutgers University Center for Research in Regulated Industries 15th Western Conference Advanced Workshop in 
Competition and Regulation. Comments there from Fred Curry, Chris King, Colin Loxley, Paul Nelson, Mark 
Reeder, and Peter Schwarz were also very useful. None of those mentioned deserve blame or guilt by association 
with any errors in this paper, which remain the author’s sole responsibility 
1 One could have time-varying prices under a regulatory scheme that holds overall prices constant. S. Borenstein, 
“Frequently Asked Questions About Implementing Real-Time Pricing in California for Summer 2001,” March 2001, 
available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDF/faq.pdf. 
2 D. Hunger, “Gas and Electric Convergence Mergers: A Supply Curve is Worth a Thousand Words,” Advanced 
Workshop in Regulation and Competition: Competitive Challenge in Network Industries,” 19th Annual Conference, 
Rutgers University Center for Research in Regulated Industries, Lake George, NY (May 26, 2000).  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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use of power plants with relatively high operating costs relative to capital costs.3 Looking solely 
at operating costs, the supply curve for electricity would be expected to slope upward with 
output.  
A second and even more important factor involves recovery of capital costs, particularly 
insofar as peak demand can take place over just a few hours in the year. Suppose that as little as 
a fourth of the costs of a marginal plant running full time are capital costs, as is the case for some 
modern natural gas plant designs.4 Suppose further that such a plant runs only 1% of the time 
(about 90 hours per year). Even though a peaking plant would likely have lower capital costs 
relative to operating costs than would a baseload plant, expected prices during those peak hours 
would need to be about 25 times what such a plant operating full time would charge if it were to 
find entry to supply at those peaks profitable.5 
A third factor is the alleged exercise of market power during peak periods, as has been 
alleged to have taken place in California6 and UK electricity markets.7 Whether such allegations 
are adequately supported empirically by comparisons of prices to average variable costs of the 
last plant used to supply power is a matter for debate elsewhere.8 However, the allegations have 
                                                 
3 R. Dansby, “Capacity Constrained Peak Load Pricing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 92 (1978): 387–98, 
especially 394; M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer, The Economics of Public Utility Pricing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1986). 
4 M. Hutzler, “Annual Energy Outlook 2002,” National Energy Modeling System/Annual Energy Outlook 2002 
Conference, Crystal City, VA (March 12, 2002); esp. slide 17, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/conf/hutzler/overview.ppt. 
5 If a plant running baseload would cost $200, $150 variable and $50 capital cost, it would have to get a price of $2 
for each percentage of the year it operates. If it operates only 1% of the year, it has to recover in that times $50 of 
capital cost, along with the $1.50 (1% of $150) in variable cost that it incurs, for a total of $51.50. That price is more 
than 25 times the price the generator would need to charge to cover costs if it were a baseload plant. 
6 S. Borenstein, J. Bushnell and F. Wolak, “Diagnosing Market Power in California's Deregulated Wholesale 
Electricity Market,” Working Paper PWP-064, University of California Energy Institute (2000); P. Joskow and E. 
Kahn, “A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 
2000,” Working Paper No. 8157, National Bureau of Economic Research (2001).  
7 C. Wolfram, “Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in 
England and Wales,” RAND Journal of Economics 29 (1998): 703–725; R. Green and D. Newbery, “Competition in 
the British Electricity Spot Market,” Journal of Political Economy 100 (1992): 929–53; J. Kwoka, Transforming 
Power: Lessons from British Electricity Restructuring, Regulation 20 (1997), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg20n3e.html. 
8 T. Brennan, “Checking for Market Power in Electricity: The Perils of Price-Cost Margins,” Discussion paper 02-
50.  Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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sufficient backing both from theory and studies assessing withholding patterns to be a possibility 
worth examining, as we explain further below.  
Charging “real time” prices requires that one’s electricity use be measured according to 
when one uses it, through real-time metering (RTM). This is in contrast to the cumulative meters 
currently standard in the industry. Cumulative meters measure how much energy one uses over 
the course of a billing period, usually a month. They can tell how much one used, but not when 
one used it. They are not designed to be able to determine how many kilowatt-hours one 
consumed when the cost of producing energy was a $10 a megawatt-hour and how much one 
consumed when the cost was a $1000/MWh.  
Earlier work has examined the potential efficiency gains from RTM. Theoretical analyses 
have identified, and in some cases questioned, the potential efficiencies from having customers 
pay prices reflecting costs at the time of use. 9 Numerous econometric and experimental studies 
go back to the early 1980s to examine how real-time (or time-of-use) pricing would affect 
demand from industrial, commercial, or residential customers.10 Simulation studies have 
examined the potential benefits and costs in terms of reallocating the risk of price variance from 
suppliers to buyers.11 Some experimental work suggests that the incentives for buyers to bargain 
created by RTM could lead to a significant reduction in electricity prices at peak periods.12 
                                                 
9 J. Mackie-Mason, “Optional Time of Use Pricing Can Be Pareto Superior or Pareto Inferior,” Economics Letters 
33 (1990): 363–67; W. Vickrey, “Efficient Pricing of Electric Power Service: Some Innovative Solutions,” 
Resources and Energy 14 (1992): 157–74; C.-K. Woo, R. Orans, B. Horii, and P. Chow, “Pareto-Superior Time-of-
Use Rate Option for Industrial Firms,” Economics Letters 49 (1995): 267–72; D. Seeto, C.-K. Woo, and I. Horowitz, 
“Time of Use Rates vs. Hopkinson Tariffs Redux: An Analysis of the Choice of Rate Structures in a Regulated 
Electricity Distribution Company,” Energy Economics 19 (1997): 169–85;  
10Among the numerous studies are D. Caves and L. Christensen, “Econometric Analysis of Residential Time-of-Use 
Pricing Experiments,” Journal of Econometrics 14 (1980): 287–306; D. Aigner and J. Hirschberg, “Commercial-
Industrial Customer Response to Time-of-Use Electricity Prices: Some Experimental Results,” RAND Journal of 
Economics 16 (1985): 341–55; T. Taylor and P. Schwarz, “The Long-Run Effects of a Time-of-Use Demand 
Charge,” RAND Journal of Economics 21 (1990): 431–45; J. Herriges, S. M. Baladi, D. Caves, and B. Neenan, “The 
Response of Industrial Customers to Electric Rates Based on Dynamic Marginal Costs,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 75 (1993): 446–54; A. Henley and J. Pierson, “Time-of-Use Electricity Pricing: Evidence from a British 
Experiment,” Economics Letters 45 (1994): 421–26; R. Patrick and F. Wolak, “Customer Responses to Real-Time 
Prices in the England and Wales Electricity Market: Implications for Demand-Side Bidding and Pricing Options 
Under Competition,” in M. Crew (ed.), Regulation Under Increasing Competition (Boston: Kluwer Academic Press, 
1999): 155–82.  
11 T. Taylor and P. Schwarz, “Advance Notice of Real-Time Electricity Prices,” Atlantic Economic Journal 28 
(2000): 478–88. 
12 S. Rassenti, V. Smith, and B. Wilson, “Turning Off The Lights,” Regulation 24 (Fall, 2001): 70–76. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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A second-best approximation to RTM would be block-of-time metering, that is, in which 
a meter registers how much power one used during times in which demand might be expected to 
be at peak levels. For example, one could systematically set higher rates for power on summer 
afternoons. Unfortunately, electricity demand is not perfectly predictable. Some summer 
afternoons may be milder than average, others may have very high heat and humidity. Moreover, 
conditions may change quickly, for example, when a thunderstorm reduces temperatures in just a 
few minutes. Ideally, one would not get an efficient response to the actual costs of electricity 
unless the prices changed as conditions changed, requiring that uses be timed precisely. Because 
even small variations in demand can lead to large changes in prices, block-of-time metering and 
billing would be an inferior substitute. 
II. But is there an RTM externality? 
Some researchers have identified potential gains to consumers from adopting RTM.13 
Others have suggested that a lack of real-time meters contributed substantially to the recent 
California crisis, and that electricity markets cannot work without RTM and thus should not be 
opened to competition until RTM is widely deployed.14  Partly in response, the state of 
California instituted recently a $35 million program to install real-time meters at the sites of the 
23,000 customers in the state with peak power demands exceeding 200 kilowatt-hours of energy 
a month.15 
Arguments that RTM should be a policy target, for example, by subsidizing meters or 
delaying restructuring until meters are installed, require more than recognizing its benefits. First, 
positive benefits need not suffice, as the benefits are finite16 and meters themselves are costly. 
Including the cost of the meters themselves, wireless transmission of usage data to the utility, 
                                                 
13 K. Train and G. Mehrez, “Optional Time-of-Use Prices for Electricity: Econometric Analysis of Surplus and 
Pareto Impacts,” RAND Journal of Economics 25 (1994): 263–83. 
14 S. Stoft, “The Market Flaw California Overlooked,” New York Times, Jan. 2, 2001, A19. 
15 C. King, “California’s Real Time Metering Program: Results to Date,” presented at the Rutgers University Center 
for Research in Regulated Industries 15th Western Conference Advanced Workshop in Competition and Regulation, 
South Lake Tahoe, CA (June 20, 2002).  
16 A. Tischler, “Optimal Production of Uncertain Interruptions in the Supply of Electricity: Estimation of Electricity 
Outage Costs,” European Economic Review 37 (1993): 1259–74. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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and providing price and usage data back to customers so they can adjust their consumption, the 
California program averaged about $1500 per site.17  
Even if the benefits in improved energy management outweigh the costs, it is not enough 
to say that it would be a good idea for me if I were to adopt RTM. From an economic 
perspective, we need to explain why it would be a good thing for you if I were to adopt RTM. 
Without such a justification, there is no market failure and thus, on economic grounds, no 
warrant for policy intervention. 
Posing the question about RTM in this way has elicited suggestions that there are supply-
side externalities associated with it. The primary basis for these suggestions seems akin to 
arguments that delivery of mail is a natural monopoly—one “meter reader” can more 
economically take data from meters than could others. There might be direct scale economies in 
installing meters, perhaps reflecting some “learning by doing.” Even if these accurately describe 
RTM technologies and processes, these do not seem to warrant policy intervention. Perhaps local 
mail delivery is a natural monopoly, because one person can deliver mail up and down a street at 
lower cost than could multiple delivery persons. But that does not mean that others benefit if I 
happen to get mail, and thus mail to me should be subsidized. 
More generally, in the rest of the economy, prices are not necessarily sufficiently flexible 
to keep supply and demand continuously equal. Good examples might be the lines outside 
popular restaurants at peak dining times, or selling out of baseball games when an opponent with 
its own strong following comes to town. In some cases, visible excess demand might be a form 
of advertising. Consumers may see a line in front of a restaurant and infer that the food is 
sufficiently good relative to its price that people find it worth standing in line, increasing their 
willingness to pay to come to the restaurant at an off-peak time.  
However, the line may simply be a byproduct of a restaurant’s inability to set time-
specific prices. If so, is there a cause for policy intervention? Need the government subsidize the 
                                                 
17 C. Rochlin, “Is Electricity a Right?” presented at the Rutgers University Center for Research in Regulated 
Industries 15th Western Conference Advanced Workshop in Competition and Regulation, South Lake Tahoe, CA 
(June 19, 2002); also calculated from King, n. 15 supra ($35 million divided by 23,000 sites). 
Returning data in real time to consumers is important; otherwise, real time pricing would have no direct effect on 
energy consumption. Whether consumers would be able and willing either to monitor prices and adjust use manually 
or to install automated system to change energy use if prices exceed a certain level, are important and open 
questions, particular for households and small commercial customers.    Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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printing of peak and off-peak menus to reduce the size of the line on Saturday nights? That we 
do not adopt policy interventions in these circumstances may largely be because the restaurant 
line problem is relatively trivial; any governmental cure will be worse than any market failure-
related disease. But the absence of any such initiatives might lead one to ask what if any 
conditions need to hold to warrant policy intervention when prices are less flexible than might be 
ideal.    
The focus here will be on externalities relating to the electricity market itself, not on scale 
economies or network effects that might reduce the cost of RTM. This work follows on two 
recent analyses of such externalities. In a less formal analysis than will be presented here, I 
conjectured that RTM would not offer any positive externalities.18 There would be no cause for 
policy intervention when those who supply electricity fulfill demands at peak periods, despite 
peak period prices charged to consumers being less than peak period costs. This result, however, 
did not necessarily hold when below-cost pricing at peak periods leads to rationing, for example, 
rolling blackouts.  
Doucet and Kleit examine these questions through simulations of electricity markets.19 
Their simulations provide some support for Brennan’s earlier conjectures and raise other 
possibilities. They first investigate the effects of RTM in competitive markets with no 
impediments to setting real-time prices. In that scenario, they generally find that the gain to the 
marginal consumer who adds a real time meter is about the same as the net gain to society as a 
whole, implying no positive externality with RTM.20 I find a similar result, explored further 
below, for a case in which electricity suppliers are obligated and able to meet demand at a peak 
                                                 
18 T. Brennan, The California Electricity Experience, 2000-01: Education or Diversion (Washington: Resources for 
the Future, 2001), particularly the appendix. The inspiration for the idea that RTM may lack externalities, despite 
having potentially large benefits, came from a presentation by analysts for the PJM wholesale electricity power pool 
to the Electricity Working Group, an informal collection of researchers from government, academia, think tanks, 
consulting firms, and industry. During this presentation, these analysts were asked whether they thought mandates 
for real-time meters were necessary. To only slightly paraphrase, they responded that if a utility is buying electricity 
for $400 per megawatt-hour and selling it for $50, they already have a huge incentive to pay consumers to adopt 
RTM.   
19 J. Doucet and A. Kleit, “Metering in Electricity Markets: When is More Better?” mimeo, March 2002. 
20 Doucet and Kleit also find that increased RTM in this scenario reduces producer surplus. No specific reason is 
given, but a reasonable guess is that real-time pricing decreases peak period demand and, consequently, marginal 
production cost and prices. This, in turn, reduces peak-period rents earned by inframarginal generation units. Doucet 
and Kleit find that a consumer who adopts RTM generates additional surplus for other consumers, creating possible 
political pressures to subsidize (discourage) RTM to the extent that consumers (producers) have disproportionate 
political clout. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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price below marginal production cost. One difference between the approach here and in Doucet 
and Kleit is that I assume here that in the competitive scenario, entry would constrain electricity 
retailers to earn zero profits. 
Doucet and Kleit’s second simulation allows peak period suppliers to exercise market 
power, simulated as a markup over the increment of marginal cost associated with on-peak 
production.21 In this setting, they find that RTM generates negative externalities when the 
markup is fixed, although if RTM makes the wholesale market conduct itself more 
competitively, these negative externalities shrink. I did not explore this but turn to this case in the 
third model below. I employ a model in which a peak-period monopolist sets prices to maximize 
profits with retailers who either pass through price increases in real time (for RTM customers) or 
charge the same prices for peak and off-peak to maintain zero profits (for non-RTM) customers.  
I find below some intuitive support for Doucet and Kleit’s result, but it does not hold in 
general. The intuition is that without RTM, a peak-period monopolist sets the price as if it were 
facing simultaneously a weighted sum of peak and off-peak demand, while it sets separate prices 
with RTM. Enacting RTM allows pricing something akin to a move toward third-degree price 
discrimination and away from uniform monopoly pricing. As such a move reduces welfare by 
discouraging highly valued consumption on-peak while increasing less valued consumption off-
peak, one would expect RTM to reduce welfare. But we will see that the case against RTM in 
this setting is weaker than that against third-degree price discrimination, all else being equal.  
Doucet and Kleit’s third model is most closely related to mine. They consider a price 
ceiling on-peak, which results in (competitive) supply less than demand. In such a case, they find 
that the decision of one customer to adopt real-time meters reduces his demand, leaving more 
supply to go to those who value the power more highly. I found the same. One analogy would be 
                                                 
21 Specifically, Doucet and Kleit assume that producers have a marginal cost of production MC(Q) given by: 
MC(Q) = C + S(Q - Q ),  
with a supply curve price set when sellers have market power is 
P(Q) = C + θS(Q - Q ), 
where Q  is the point in the generation cost function where capacity is approached, S > 0, and θ > 1. The form of 
this function is specified in advance; it is not derived from a monopoly or oligopoly model of price setting based on 
the peak period demand curve and the strategic game played by suppliers. In some simulations, they allow θ to 
shrink with increased adoption of RTM, reflecting a possibility that RTM improves competitiveness among 
wholesale energy suppliers. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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to a line at a restaurant, where menu costs (literally) prevent charging higher prices at peak. If 
those in the front of the line had a method in which they paid the opportunity cost for meals, 
some would get out of the line, reducing the wait for others who might value meals more.  
To summarize, I attempt to show below that RTM presents no positive externalities when 
utilities are obliged to serve peak period users despite losses. There are, however justifying 
externalities when electricity rationing takes the form of rolling blackouts, because such 
blackouts affect both high valuing uses and low valuing uses equally. We cannot say in general 
whether RTM increases welfare when peak period wholesale markets are not competitive.  The 
tradeoffs appear to be somewhat more favorable in the case of RTM than in the formally similar 
issue of whether or not a monopolist should be allowed to “third degree price discriminate,” that 
is, to set different prices for the same good in different markets.    
III. General properties of the models 
To model the use of RTM, we need to break down demand by customers, to reflect the 
possibility that some customers have real-time meters and face one set of prices, while those who 
do not have real time meters face another. In addition, to see whether real time meters are chosen 
efficiently in equilibrium, we need to determine which consumers get RTM and which do not 
within the model itself. To do so, assume that there is a continuum of N customers, indexed by i. 
Let D
P(P, i) be the peak period demand for energy at price P by customer i; off-peak demand will 
be D
OP(P, i).22 We recognize that this bifurcation abstracts from a reality in which there is a 
continuum of demands depending on time-of-day, season, weather conditions, and other random 
factors.  




OP/∂P < 0; ∂D
P/∂i, ∂D
OP/∂i > 0. 
The first set of partial derivatives is the standard assumption that demand curves slope 
downward. The second set is the common tractability assumption that demand curves do not 
                                                 
22 Unless the letter P is a superscript, “P” will refer to price.  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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cross, that is, as we move up the index of consumers, the quantity that a consumer demands at 
any price increases, peak or off-peak.  
We further simplify by assuming that the fraction of time T at which demand is at peak is 
exogenous, but that the specific times that are peak times are unknown in advance. In models of 
competitive markets, we generally set T = .5, that is, the length of time at which demand is at 
peak levels is the same as the time it is not. This is purely a notational convenience, to avoid 
carrying around terms reflecting weights in calculating endogenous prices or welfare; it will not 
change the qualitative conclusions.  
An additional simplification, perhaps more critical in an analysis of RTM, is that demand 
off-peak is independent of peak period prices and vice versa. In other words, we rule out here the 
possibility that higher peak period prices would lead consumers to substitute off-peak uses for 
peak uses, for example, using dryers in the evening rather than the daytime. The possibility of 
efficient intertemporal substitution is a clear private benefit of RTM and would need to be 
incorporated into any estimation of the net benefits of an RTM program. However, as we discuss 
below, whether externalities exist, and which direction they may take, is unlikely to be affected 
by this assumption. 
Reflecting our use of price rather than quantity, the gross measure of consumer benefit 
B(P, i) for consumer i buying at price P at time period X (peak or off-peak) will be 
 B




X X ) , P ( D P dz ) , (z D i i . (1) 
Graphically the first term, the integral, would be the area between the demand curve and the 
horizontal line at price P. The second term is the revenue paid by the consumers for the product. 




X/∂P] < 0.  (2) 
This is the area under the demand curve lost when price increases incrementally. 
On the supply side, we divide the industry into retail and wholesale markets. We assume 
for simplicity that the supply curve for the production of electricity at wholesale is given by a 
marginal cost curve that is the same on-peak and off-peak. This, too, involves some significant 
oversimplifications. First, we abstract from regulatory reserve and ancillary service 
requirements. Second, and perhaps more important, on-peak prices have to cover the costs of the Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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additional generation capacity needed to meet demand.23 Abstracting from that here, in the 
competitive cases we model a general wholesale supply curve S(P), where if C(Q) is the cost of 
producing energy, 
  C'(S(P)) = P, 
that is, the marginal cost of the last unit supplied at a given price is that price. 
The retail sector imposes no costs of its own, 24 but may be subject to a zero-profit free-
entry constraint or face regulated retail prices and obligations. Retailers sell power to customers 
lacking RTM at the same price peak or off-peak. They cannot distinguish among customers on 
the basis of how much of that customer’s demand is peak and how much is off-peak or on their 
level of overall demand, that is, where on the continuum between 0 and N they fall. Retailers 
cannot achieve something like RTM by agreeing to serve only customers whose demands are 
predominantly or exclusively at one period or the other.25 For customers with real time meters, a 
retailer can charge separate prices for peak and off-peak power, and we will assume throughout 
that those prices equal the wholesale purchase prices of that power. 
IV. Retailers obliged to serve 
Our first case to talk about matches the initial situation in California, prior to and perhaps 
after the bankruptcy or near-bankruptcy of the major distribution utilities. During this period, 
utilities generally had to purchase wholesale power at very high prices and sell it at relatively 
                                                 
23 The appropriate “marginal cost” curve needs to include the long-run average cost of that capacity. Brennan, n. 8 
supra and n. 18 supra at 37–40. The appropriate marginal cost calculation is further complicated by costs associated 
with starting up and shutting down capacity. S. Harvey and W. Hogan, “Identifying the Exercise of Market Power in 
California,” Dec. 28, 2001, available at 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Hogan%20Harvey%20CA%20Market%20Power%2012-28-01.pdf. Much 
of the controversy over the extent of market power in the wholesale electricity sector, and how best to measure it, is 
connected to the difficulty of ascertaining marginal cost in practice and whether available measures include capital 
as well as operating costs. 
24 I neglect marginal costs associated with transmission, distribution, and marketing. Incorporating those costs at 
this stage would only add a constant term to the retail price and would not have substantial effects on the 
conclusions I reach. 
25 We do not consider here that that time-of-day pricing could be an imperfect substitute for RTM, in particular, that 
those imperfections are sufficiently small in and of themselves to make the costs of installing real-time meters less 
than the benefits.  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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low prices, until their financial ability to purchase power ran out. To analyze this case, I describe 
the equilibrium amount of RTM that one would see and compare those equilibrium conditions to 
the conditions for a welfare maximum.  
A. Market equilibrium 
Define P* as the price charged at both peak and off-peak periods to customers without 
RTM, P
P as the price charged on-peak to those with RTM, and P
OP as the off-peak price RTM 
customers pay. Let R be the cost of installing an RTM for a customer, independent of the amount 
of energy uses. There will be a consumer K who is indifferent as to whether he adopts RTM. We 
assume (discussed below) that customers with i < K do not get RTM, and those with i > K do. 
In equilibrium, the amounts demanded on-peak and off-peak have to equal the amounts 
supplied. With the specifications of the model, this implies 





P ) , (P D ) *, (P D di i di i  = S(P
P)   (3) 
and 





OP ) , (P D ) *, (P D di i di i  = S(P
OP). (4) 
Applying the marginal cost function C' to the left and right sides of these equations gives the 
price equivalents of these supply and demand equations. The price on-peak and off-peak charged 
to RTM customers equals the marginal cost of supplying electricity to both RTM and non-RTM 
customers. 
 We can treat P* in one of two ways. One, akin to the California situation, would be to 
treat it as an exogenous parameter arising as a legacy of prior regulation and restructuring 
policies. A second would be to treat it as endogenously set to keep retailers whole. If we assume 
that retailers are unable to identify customer by type (between 0 and N), P* will be the price 
necessary to keep retailers who serve non-RTM customers profitable, that is, the price equal to 
the average cost of serving such users. That average cost is the weighted average of peak and off-
peak prices P
P and P
OP, where the weights are the quantities demanded peak and off-peak by 
non-RTM customers. Equivalently, the total revenue paid by RTM customers would have to 
equal the total cost to retailers of the electricity provided to them over peak and off-peak periods. 
This condition, which defines P*, is Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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To calculate K, the consumer indifferent about getting or not getting a real-time meter, 
we assume no transaction costs, so that the net welfare for customer K is the same with and 
without RTM. From equation (1), K’s welfare without RTM will be B
P(P*, K) + B
OP(P*, K). The 
cost to retailers of serving a customer of type K is P
PD
P(P*, K) + P
OPD
OP(P*, K). Hence, the net 
welfare of serving K without RTM, WnonRTM, will be 
 W nonRTM = B
P(P*, K) + B
OP(P*, K) – [P
PD
P(P*, K) + P
OPD
OP(P*, K)]. 
The expression for net welfare if K uses RTM, WRTM, is similar, except that one has to subtract 
the cost of the real-time meter, R.  
 W RTM = B
P(P
P, K) + B
OP(P
OP, K) – [P
PD
P(P
P, K) + P
OPD
OP(P
OP, K)] – R. 
Setting WRTM = WnonRTM, employing equation (1), and collecting terms, gives 
 P
P[D
P(P*, K) – D
P(P
P, K)] –  ∫
P P
* P
P dz ) K , (z D  





dz ) K , (z D P
OP[D
OP(P
OP, K) – D
OP(P
*, K)] = R  (6) 
The first two terms are the cost savings to the seller from reducing underpriced on-peak sales to 
K at the non-RTM average price, less the surplus K loses by having to pay the higher price. This 
is a net gain to the seller. Off-peak, the buyer gains from being able to purchase at a lower price 
with RTM, but one has to subtract the cost of supplying K with that additional output. For 
customer K, these two net gains have to just cover the cost of the real-time meter, R. Figure 1 









Figure 1: Welfare gains from adopting RTM 
For tractability, we would like to be able to say that for customers with i > K, these gains exceed 
R, and they buy real-time meters. For customers with i < K, these gains are less than R, and they 
do not adopt RTM. This, however, need not be the case, even with non-crossing demand curves. 
Essentially, a customer with j > i can have a smaller welfare gain from adopting RTM if her 
demands are significantly less elastic within the relevant price ranges than that of customer i.26 
To make the model feasible, we need to assume directly the supposition introduced at the 
beginning of this section: that the welfare gain from RTM, as well as demand, increases as the 
index i of customers increases.  With that added assumption, equations (3)–(6) are four equations 
in the four unknowns K, P
P, P
OP, and P*, defining the equilibrium adoption of RTM and the 
associated prices.  
B. Optimum conditions and implications for RTM policy 
Whether we have the right amount of RTM in this case comes down to whether we would 
obtain the same K at the social optimum. Net economic welfare (NEW) is the total gross surplus 
                                                 
26 To help see this, imagine the extreme case where j’s demand exceeds i’s, but is perfectly inelastic between the 
RTM and non-RTM price. The potential gains from trade from offering RTM to customer j are thus zero, as the 
gains to the seller would just match j’s losses. However, if i’s demand is not perfectly inelastic between these two 
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reaped by customers peak and off-peak, less the costs of producing output for them and the cost 
of supplying real time meters to those who use them. We want to choose K, P
P, P
OP, and P* (if 
endogenous) to maximize 
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The first line in NEW is the consumer benefit of non-RTM and RTM customers respectively on-
peak, less the cost of providing them with energy on-peak. The second line is the same calculated 
off-peak, except for the last term, which is the cost of supplying RTM to N – K customers. 
If P* is defined endogenously as a zero-profit condition for serving non-RTM customers, 
then P* is a variable of choice but the maximization is subject to equation (5) above, the defining 
condition for P*. If P* is defined independently of the other market variables, for example, as a 
regulatory price ceiling, no such condition is needed and P* can be treated as an exogenous 
parameter.  
For simplicity, examine the second possibility first. It is straightforward to show that P
P 
and P
OP equal the respective marginal costs of producing electricity on-peak and off-peak. The 
first-order condition found by setting equal to zero the partial derivative of NEW with respect to 
K gives equation (6). These results together imply: 
•  Proposition 1: If retail utilities are obliged to meet demand at exogenously imposed 
prices, the market equilibrium amount of real time meters equals the social optimum. 
The situation is slightly more complicated if P* is determined endogenously. The 
optimum is now to maximize the Lagrangian L given by 
L(K, P
P, P
OP, P*, λ) = NEW(K, P
P, P
OP, P*) 
– λ[P*  

 
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Setting the first-order condition for K equal to zero sets equation (6), the condition in the market 
equilibrium, equal to 
  λ[P*[D
P(P*, K) + D
OP(P*, K)] – P
PD
P(P
P, K) – P
OPD(P
OP, K)]  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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This term will be zero if the zero profit condition that holds for serving all customers 
without RTM holds for the marginal customer without RTM. For example, if for all customers 
peak demand is the same multiple of off-peak demand, the zero-profit condition that holds for 
the average of all customers will hold for the marginal customer. If so, the first-order conditions 
satisfied in the market equilibrium will be the same as in the constrained maximization. 
This only suggests the absence of externalities associated with RTM in this case. A first 
complication is that the zero-profit condition need not hold for the marginal consumer K. If not, 
there could be negative as well as positive externalities from RTM.27 This effect would not 
appear to be large, as the difference between the marginal and average consumer in terms of the 
relative amounts of peak and off-peak demand would not seem to be predictably significant in 
either direction. This is, however, an empirical and not theoretical question. 
The second complication is that if the constraint (5) binds, the optimal P
P and P
OP will be 
below marginal cost.28 The wedge created by the cost of real-time meters may create an 
inefficiency. But the best response to that inefficiency may not be to subsidize meters, but to 
increase welfare at the margin by reducing prices, if retailers and wholesalers earn zero profits at 
the market optimum. As with the first effect, the direction is not clear and the magnitude does 
not seem great. We summarize these with:  
•  Observation 1: When retail utilities are under an obligation to serve but the non-RTM 
price is endogenous, there could be too little or too much RTM; in neither direction does 
the effect appear large. 
                                                 
27 We expect that λ > 0, as λ is the shadow price of raising P
P and P
OP to ensure that the constraint is satisfied. If the 
first-order condition would appear to hold for the market equilibrium, ∂L/∂K will be positive (negative) if the profits 
of providing non-RTM service to customer K are positive (negative). This would imply that welfare would increase 
if K were to increase (decrease), hence that the market leads to marginally too much (too little) RTM. 
28 For the peak period price P
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As λ is positive, the integral in the numerator is positive, and the integral in the denominator is negative, on-peak 
price is less than on-peak marginal cost. A similar relation holds for off-peak prices.  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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V. Rationed energy 
A. The potential positive externality  
As we saw at times in California during the summer of 2001, the utilities may not always 
be willing or able to meet obligations to serve. Wholesalers may be capacity-constrained, unable 
to supply power at any feasible price equal to the amount demanded at the retail price utilities 
inherited under a regulatory scheme. In addition, as one might expect with retail deregulation, a 
retail utility will not purchase power at a cost above the (time-independent) price at which they 
can sell that power. A widespread absence of RTM would preclude separate on-peak and off-
peak prices at which markets could be cleared in both periods. 
A difference between demand and supply requires some form of rationing. In the case of 
electricity, when the price is the same both peak and off-peak, the rationing is two-sided. On-
peak, demand would exceed supply if the legacy or rationed equilibrium price were, as one 
would expect, less than the price that would clear a market if a separate on-peak price could be 
charged. Off-peak, the amount firms would want to supply at the going price is likely to exceed 
demand, requiring rationing of buyers among sellers. In both situations, the welfare effects of 
rationing depend on how the supply is allocated among buyers on-peak, and how demand is 
allocated among sellers off-peak. Modeling rationed markets requires some assumptions as to 
how this allocation is done.  
Off-peak, we will assume that the rationing takes place by having the least cost electricity 
produced to meet demand at the off-peak price, if that price exceeds the market-clearing price. 
This is a natural assumption if transaction costs among generators themselves are sufficiently 
low to allow them to minimize their collective costs of producing power, for example, by setting 
up a wholesale market to compete to serve the given demand.  
Rationing on the buyers’ side is not so easy to model. Transaction costs for the buyers to 
reallocate based on willingness to pay is not feasible, not least because of the lack of RTM that 
would enable such real-time reallocations to work. Moreover, as a technical matter, one cannot 
easily direct electricity to the higher valued uses and not to the lower valued ones. Demands for 
the lower valued uses need to be removed altogether. To get power for your refrigerator to keep 
food for your family, I have to agree not to turn my stereo on and thus risk blacking out your 
refrigerator.  
These factors together suggest that rationing on the buyers’ side will require cutting off 
sufficient numbers of customers altogether from getting power, until demand from the remaining Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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customers no longer exceeds supply.29 The likelihood πB that any consumer will face a blackout 
is given by the fraction of the amount of electricity consumers demand in the aggregate that is 
not met by supply at the below market-clearing on-peak price. Using the notation from the 
previous sections, let aggregate on-peak demand DD





P(P D di ) i *,  (8) 
allowing us to set πB equal to 






where S(P*) is the competitive supply curve at P*, equal to the inverse of the marginal cost 
curve. We assume here that P* is determined exogenously, to avoid the difficulties in calculating 
what it would be in equilibrium.30  
To understand the potential externalities of adopting RTM, we need first to posit what 
happens to the market as a whole if someone adopts a real-time meter, and then see how that 
supposition affects the incentives for a buyer and seller to adopt RTM. We assume first that 
adopting RTM does not affect whether or not the adopter is rationed, but that as more customers 
adopted RTM, the degree of rationing would decline. The amount demanded on-peak will fall 
                                                 
29 This may be consistent with some sorting of demand. If cutting power to customers is feasible in real-time on a 
customer-specific basis, customers who most value the right to purchase electricity at the going price on-peak could 
pay to be included, leaving those for whom blackouts are less costly to bear them. To some extent, geographic 
concentrations of similar types of buyers could allow something like this, for example, if retailers could cut off 
commercial but not residential customers. Less equitably, socioeconomic concentration could allow power suppliers 
to cut off poor customers for whom the willingness to pay to avoid a blackout is presumably less than the rich 
customers it would continue to serve (and who would outbid poor customers to avoid being blacked out). 
30 These calculations are difficult if not indeterminate for at least two reasons. One is that we need to specify that the 
retailers are not contractually bound to supply power to their customers at the agreed-upon price during peak 
periods. If they are, the equilibrium would probably be equivalent to that in the previous section, in which retailers 
have contractually binding obligations to serve, yet earn zero profits. Second, if such contracts are nonbinding—
perhaps because utilities could declare bankruptcy rather than honor them—one lacks a story without an upward-
sloping supply curve, perhaps with capacity constraints. Such markets may have multiple or no Bertrand equilibria.  
With some simplifying assumptions, one can obtain an equilibrium in which the output of electricity at all times 
equals the market-clearing amount off-peak. But this is an unsatisfactory result. It appears to hold regardless of the 
expected fraction of time at which demand would be peak (including, say, 99%) or the ratio of peak to off-peak 
demand (including, say, 100).  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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with a higher on-peak price, and the amount supplied off-peak would rise with a lower off-peak 
price.31 It should become more profitable to purchase power and to sell it to customers able to 
pay a higher peak period price.  
This indicates that RTM will be underpurchased relative to the socially optimal amount. 
Consider first an atomistic buyer, who takes not just prices but the probability of a blackout, πB, 
as given. Such a customer’s willingness to pay for RTM will be limited by the chance that even 
if she agrees to pay a higher price for electricity on-peak, she will not be able to make such a 
purchase πB of the time. An individual’s only incentive to cover the cost of RTM, and pay a 
(perhaps only slightly) higher peak period price, would be to become able to purchase off-peak 
energy at a price equal to its marginal cost of production, below P*. On the sellers’ side, when 
they are not required to sell electricity on-peak at a price below the wholesale price, they lack the 
incentive of sellers under such an obligation to cover the cost of RTM in order to pay customers 
to demand less energy.  
Not only is the incentive to adopt RTM smaller in a rationing model, but there are clear 
benefits to others if it were adopted. Positive externalities would be present if the more RTM is 
adopted, the more consumers there are who pay a higher price of electricity, reducing on-peak 
demand and thus πB, the likelihood of a blackout. The consumer, however, does not take this 
blackout-reduction effect into account. Accordingly, rationing has two effects on the RTM 
market. It reduces the willingness of buyers and sellers to enter into RTM deals below what one 
would see if sellers were obliged to serve. It also creates an uninternalized benefit on others, 
through a reduction in the likelihood of a blackout. These suggest: 
•  Observation 2: If buyers are rationed in electricity markets through random blackouts, 
RTM will be undersupplied.   
This observation appears to be relatively robust. First, weaken the assumption that a 
buyer is not atomistic, that is, allow a buyer to believe that if it adopts RTM, it will affect the 
likelihood of a blackout over the market as a whole. This would increase such a “big” buyer’s 
willingness to adopt RTM. However, the remainder of the market would also benefit by this big 
buyer’s adoption of RTM; hence, the positive externality would remain. Second, we might posit 
that even if buyers are atomistic, that the seller could internalize the benefits to its other 
                                                 
31 Any intertemporal substitution of electricity demand between peak and off-peak periods would make these effects 
even more pronounced. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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customers from encouraging them to adopt RTM and reduce πB. However, this internalization 
will not be perfect, because the benefits would accrue to other sellers as well. Positive 
externalities will remain unless the electricity retailer is a monopolist with the ability to engage 
in sufficient price discrimination to capture the different gains different consumers would obtain 
from reducing the likelihood of a blackout.   
B. Related conjectures  
One might ask whether RTM would be adopted if it not only permitted high on-peak 
pricing but also, in so doing, reduced that consumer’s likelihood of being in a blackout. If so, 
demand for RTM would increase greatly. I expect (but do not show here) that the largest buyers 
would purchase RTM and the smaller ones would choose to accept rationing. In such a case, 
RTM could have positive or negative externalities. The probability of a blackout, πB, would 
depend on the difference between supply and demand for those customers still rationed. Those 
customers could see increased rationing, if the large customers have a proportionally smaller 
difference between what they demand on-peak and the electricity they were getting while 
rationed. Hence, one effect of a marginal increase in RTM could be to induce negative 
externalities, by making rationing more likely for the non-RTM customers.  
However, in this setting the effects of RTM have little to do with regulating demand and 
more to do with sorting customers less willing to tolerate blackouts from those more willing to 
do so. The story would be much the same if we dropped the pricing aspect of RTM and regarded 
it simply a switch that consumers could buy to avoid being rationed. The effect of RTM in this 
case would be primarily to reallocate blackouts, not to alleviate them throughout the grid by 
bringing peak energy prices more in line with marginal production cost. 
Next, suppose on-peak rationing were efficient in the sense that off-peak rationing is, 
namely, that electricity were allocated to satisfy those demands with the highest reservation 
prices. If so, there would be no inefficient substitution of low-valued uses for high-valued uses, 
and RTM would seem to produce no positive externalities. If the price of a meter were a constant 
fraction of the price of electricity, there would be no externality. RTM would be purchased up to 
the point where everyone’s willingness to pay for the last MWh of electricity covers the cost of 
the energy itself plus, in effect, the cost of billing for it. No significant policy-relevant Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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externalities would seem to arise if RTM has a fixed per-customer rather than per-unit cost and is 
priced accordingly.32  
One might not want to spend a great deal of time on this conjecture. There is no practical 
method for allocating electricity according to reservation price and blacking out only low-valued 
uses when demand exceeds supply. In power outages, the refrigerators go out with the stereos. 
To the extent that blackouts can be directed toward particular regions an away from those with 
relatively high willingness to pay for electricity, for example, areas including hospitals, some 
locationally efficient rationing may be possible.33  In addition, large customers who do not adopt 
RTM could have their demand “managed” via programs that cut energy use remotely, for 
example, cutting off residential air conditioner compressors for short periods during very hot 
days, or putting industrial customers on interruptible power.34 However, energy distributors still 
could not selectively cut power only to those customers who had not adopted RTM. 
VI. Market power 
Many commentators have alleged that the rise in wholesale electricity prices in California 
during the summer of 2000 was due to the exercise of market power. Some suggest that RTM 
would introduce more resistance to paying higher prices on-peak than one would see when such 
prices are either absorbed by retailers or averaged in with off-peak prices to create the uniform 
price paid over time.35 As noted above, Doucet and Kleit’s simulations produced a contrary 
result, that RTM would reduce welfare.  
To examine the effects of RTM with market power, I begin by focusing on the wholesale 
sector, assuming that the retail sector introduces no costs. To avoid getting bogged down in the 
menu of possible strategic models, I model wholesale market power as if the generators acted 
like a cartel on-peak.  Because of the extent of industry capacity relative to off-peak demand, I 
take off-peak wholesale prices as competitively set. To avoid some notational complications, I 
assume that the competitive off-peak wholesale price of electricity is a constant, MC
OP. As in 
                                                 
32 By analogy, there are no market inefficiencies simply because the cost of driving to the store is independent of the 
amount one spends on groceries. 
33 I thank Joe Doucet for this observation. 
34 I thank Paul Nelson for this observation. See also King, n. 15 supra. 
35 Borenstein, n. 1 supra.  Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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Section IV above, with no RTM, the retail sector charges a uniform price on-peak and off-peak 
that guarantees zero profits with no rationing. With RTM, the peak and off-peak prices set at the 
wholesale sector get passed on to consumers directly. To simplify the analysis, we look at how 
the wholesale sector would perform with and without RTM, as if metering were costless. 
However, to make the analysis slightly more transparent, we reintroduce the variable T, the 
fraction of time demand is at peak, but we continue to treat T as exogenous (and on-peak and 
off-peak demand curves as independent of each other’s prices). 
As specified in equation (8), let DD
P be aggregate demand on-peak, and similarly let 
DD
OP be aggregate demand off-peak. In a world without RTM, we have that the price of 
electricity (neglecting any retail costs) meets the zero-profit condition for retailers, adapted from 
equation (5) above to reflect demand from all N customers and to include the fraction of time at 















over the fraction of time T at peak demand, subject to how equation (9) defines P* in terms of P
P.  
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OP]DD
OP(P*) (11) 
If retailers are averaging high peak period costs into an overall price, the peak period monopolist 
is essentially setting the constant price that maximizes the sum of peak and off-peak profits. The 
first group of terms on the right hand side of equation (11) is the profit on-peak at P*; the second 
group is the profits off-peak at P*. Without RTM, the on-peak monopoly acts as if it were a 
monopolist off-peak as well, albeit constrained to set price uniformly in the two markets, using 
P
P to set P* as specified by equation (9). 
One other result will prove useful. Let the relationship between P* and P
P in equation (9) 
be given by P* = H(P
P). Then, setting P
P to maximize Π(P
P) as defined in equation (10) gives the 
first-order condition 
   [P
P – C']DD
P'(P*)H' + DD
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Let EPD be the absolute value of the elasticity of peak demand and EP*/P be the elasticity 
of P* with respect to P
P, that is, 
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If the ratio of on-peak to off-peak demand does not shrink much as P* increases, EP*/P < 1.36 
Suppose the market adopted RTM. Off-peak, consumers would pay MC
OP, the 
competitive price. On-peak, they would pay P
P as set by the wholesale electricity monopolist. 
That wholesale monopolist would maximize profits as given by equation (10), except that instead 
of peak demand being at P*, it would be at P
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If EP*/P < 1, comparing equations (12) and (13) shows that the wholesale price set without RTM 
will exceed that set with RTM. This is not surprising; with RTM, the on-peak monopolist cannot 
force the off-peak purchasers to absorb its price increases. 
A comparison of (13) with (11) shows that moving from no RTM to universal RTM 
transforms us from a market in which off-peak and on-peak are monopolized at a uniform price, 
to one in which the off-peak market is competitive but the profit-maximizing monopoly price on-
peak. Under the assumption that the on-peak monopoly price is higher than the uniform profit-
                                                 
36 The algebra is a bit gruesome, but if we let K(P*) = DDP(P*)/DDOP(P*), the ratio of on-peak to off-peak 
demand, then one can show that 
EP*/P = 
K' * TP T 1 TK





If K' is positive or zero or if it only slightly negative—if the ratio of peak demand to off-peak demand increase with 
P*, stays constant, or does not fall by much, the numerator of the above expression is less than the denominator. If 
so, EP*/P < 1. Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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maximizing price across both on-peak and off-peak markets, RTM raises price on-peak to 
consumers and cuts it off-peak. This leads to:  
•  Observation 3: With market power in wholesale electricity, adopting RTM will reduce 
the price charged by wholesalers but raise the price paid by consumers during peak 
periods. It will, however, reduce prices off-peak, perhaps to marginal cost, if there is no 
market power off-peak. 
 Were the off-peak price with RTM the single monopoly price for off-peak power, we 
would have a situation somewhat akin to third-degree price discrimination. If that is an 
appropriate analogy, we would have the familiar set of ambiguities. Economic welfare with 
RTM could be higher or lower than without it. Welfare with RTM would be lower (greater) if the 
loss in output from the high price (on-peak) market equaled or exceeded the gain in output from 
the (off-peak) low price market.  
The possibility that moving to RTM reduces welfare supports the result in Doucet and 
Kleit's simulation that RTM has negative externalities in the presence of market power. 
However, the intuition from third-degree price discrimination that supports such a conclusion 
needs to be qualified in two important respects. First, if T, the fraction of time demand is at peak 
levels, is small, the gains in output from lower off-peak prices would be more likely to outweigh 
the losses from charging high prices on-peak (although increasing T could increase P
P absent 
RTM). Second, the price-discrimination analogy does not apply directly in that the cost of 
supplying the marginal unit of energy on-peak is greater than the marginal cost of energy off-
peak. The loss in welfare from an output reduction on-peak relative to off-peak will be lower 
than in price discrimination models in which marginal costs of serving all markets are the same. 
These suggest: 
•  Observation 4: The welfare effects of RTM are ambiguous, and its adoption could lead 
to reduced welfare overall. However, because on-peak marginal costs exceed off-peak, 
the off-peak price is competitive, and off-peak time is likely to be significantly longer in 
aggregate than on-peak time, the balance will tilt in favor of RTM more than intuition 
regarding third-degree price discrimination might indicate. 
 
VII. Summary 
Setting real-time prices for electricity, using real-time metering, could bring important 
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Making consumers more sensitive to price will reduce the incentive of electricity generators and 
marketers to exercise market power during peak-demand periods. These benefits, however, need 
not imply that too few consumers adopt RTM because it creates positive externalities affecting 
non-RTM customers and their energy suppliers. Public policy to encourage more widespread 
adoption of RTM may be neither necessary nor desirable.  
The adoption of RTM has predictable positive externalities when doing so reduces the 
probability of random blackouts. When utilities can meet obligations to serve customers under an 
exogenously set regulated price, they will adopt the socially optimal amount of RTM without 
policy intervention. RTM may be marginally undersupplied or oversupplied when the retail price 
is endogenously set to maintain zero profits in the downstream sector. If a consumer’s adoption 
of RTM allowed him to specifically avoid blackouts, we find a similar marginal ambiguity, 
depending upon whether the non-RTM consumers are more or less likely to have blackouts 
restricted to their universe. In neither case, however, does the effect in either direction seem 
great.  
When wholesalers have market power, the effects of RTM are also ambiguous, for much 
the same reason that third-degree price discrimination is. While RTM reduces the on-peak price 
of wholesale electricity paid by retailers, it raises the on-peak price paid by consumers, reducing 
on-peak consumption and welfare. On the other hand, RTM causes price to fall off-peak; under 
the assumptions of our models, the off-peak price falls to the competitive level. The trade-off for 
RTM is likely to be more favorable than the tradeoff typical for third-degree price 
discrimination. The marginal cost of on-peak price exceeds that for off-peak—reducing the 
overall welfare loss from reduced on-peak purchases—and the off-peak price is competitive 
rather than a lower monopoly price.  
The models used to support these results adopted simplifications in the interests of 
tractability and clarity.  These simplifications, however, do not seem to affect the qualitative 
results. In particular, neglecting intertemporal substitution, although a serious flaw for empirical 
estimation, does not seem to bias results regarding the presence and direction of any market 
failures. The first proposition, that there is no market failure when suppliers meet demand, is 
essentially that absent rationing, RTM is demanded up to the point where its marginal benefit 
equals its marginal cost. Intertemporal substitution might change the prices and quantities at 
which that equalization takes place, but it does not change the fact of the equalization and, hence, 
the absence of market failure.   Resources for the Future  Brennan 
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When there is rationing, intertemporal substitution would, all else being equal, increase 
the benefits to the grid overall from one customer’s adoption of RTM, as it presumably makes 
peak demand more elastic. That effect would increase the positive externality from adopting 
RTM, supporting the results in the paper. Similarly, this increased elasticity of on-peak demand 
would change the absolute magnitude of the results involving market power, but not the relative 
welfare levels associated with and without RTM, maintaining the ambiguity we found in that 
analysis.  
More detailed and precisely analyzed models could shed additional light on the 
conditions under which we have too little RTM, and the conditions under which we have too 
much. Nevertheless, it does seem safe to say at this stage that there is no general case for 
encouraging additional RTM, except to encourage conservation in order to reduce the likelihood 
of random or rolling blackouts. 
 